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IMPORTANT LESSONS FROM HISTORY
Wendy Brown-Scott*
REVIEWING:
CONTEMPT OF COURT: THE TURN-OF-THE-CENTURY LYNCHING THAT
LAUNCHED A HUNDRED YEARS OF FEDERALISM
By MARK CURRIDEN & LEROY PHILLIPS, JR.
NEW YORK: FABER AND FABER. 1999.
It has been an unwritten law in the South, since the memory
of man runneth not to the contrary that the black man who
assaults the white woman shall die. The law maintains in
every southern state, and is higher than any statutory law.'
"We're coming to get you, Negro. . .no damn Supreme
Court will save you tonight. ' ' 2
"To Justice Harlan. Come get your nigger now. ' '3
At the beginning of the twenty first century, many innocent men
and women sit on death rows across America. 4 A disproportionate number
are African American in the South. 5 The Anti-Terrorism and Effective
* Professor of Law, Tulane Law School. Thanks to Tamekia Wherry Reese and
Marshella Atkinson for invaluable research and assistance.
1 MARK CURRIDEN & LEROY PHILLIPS, JR., CONTEMPT OF COURT: THE TURN-OF-
THE-CENTURY LYNCHING THAT LAUNCHED A HUNDRED YEARS OF FEDERALISM 230
(1999) [hereinafter CONTEMPT OF COURT].
2 Id. at 209.
3 Id. at 214. (quoting from the note pinned to the body of Ed Johnson).
4 As of January 1, 2002, 3711 men and women await execution in state and
federal prisons. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC., DEATH
Row U.S.A. at 3. (Winter 2002). Despite the heightened public awareness of the
imposition of the death penalty on the innocent, Congress has cut funding for death
penalty resource centers that have helped vindicate numerous death row inmates.
Available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org.
5 While African Americans constitute about 12 percent of the nation's popula-
tion, 43% of death row inmates are black. NAACP, DEATH Row U.S.A. at 3. See
also, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 233
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Death Penalty Act of 19966 limits access to federal courts through the
habeas corpus petitions making the execution of innocent people inevita-
ble.7 The current bench of the United States Supreme Court also hastens the
process by frequently denying final review.8
Yet at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
displayed a high level of courage and sensitivity to the plight of a twenty-
four year old southern Black man, one generation out of slavery, named Ed
Johnson. Johnson was convicted for the rape of Nevada Taylor, a young
white woman. Johnson's attorneys won habeas corpus review in the United
States Supreme Court after a clearly unconstitutional trial.9 Ultimately,
however, as were many Black men accused of sexually assaulting a white
woman, Johnson was lynched, as routinely as women hung laundry in the
hot southern breeze, before the Court could decide his petition. Contempt of
Court chronicles the events leading up to United States v. Shipp 0, a now
(1999) and SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICs 549 (1999). Of the nu-
merous instances in which innocent people have been executed, researchers have
documented several cases in the South of black men tried by all white juries and
executed for the rape of a white woman. See H. Bedau & M. Radelet, Miscarriages
of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21, 65 (1987). In McCles-
key v. Kemp, 482 U.S. 920 (1987), the defendant challenged the imposition of the
death penalty on African Americans in Georgia as violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection clause and the Eight Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. The Court agreed that studies proved that black
defendants convicted of murdering white victims in Georgia received the death
penalty more often than white defendants or black defendants convicted of murder-
ing black victims. Id. at 286-287. The Court concluded, however, that race did not
impermissibly influence sentencing decisions. Id. at 297-298.
6 See Pub. L. No.104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)(AEDPA).
7 In Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998), Justice Scalia wrote,
The purpose of AEDPA is not obscure. It was to eliminate the
interminable delays in the execution of state and federal criminal
sentences, and the shameful overloading of our federal criminal
justice system, produced by various aspects of this Court's
habeas corpus jurisprudence.
Id. at 265 (dissenting).
8 See e.g., Barber v. Tennessee, 513 U.S. 1184 (Mem)(1995)(denying writ of
certiorari); Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (Mem)(1995)(denying writ of certio-
rari); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996)(denying writ of habeas corpus).
9 See infra notes 32 through 40.
10 214 U.S. 386 (1909).
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obscure decision from the only criminal trial ever conducted before the na-
tion's highest court.11
Most constitutional criminal procedure courses focus on cases such
as Powell v. Alabama12 and Brown v. Mississippi3 to illustrate the expan-
sion of federal court authority into state criminal proceedings on substantive
due process grounds to protect the constitutional rights of black defendant
before the civil rights revolution and the adoption of the doctrine of incor-
poration. The authors of Contempt of Court correctly imply in their subtitle
that in Shipp, the Court significantly expanded the power of the federal
courts to intervene in state affairs pursuant to the fourteenth amendment and
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.14 Mark Curriden 15 and Leroy Phillips, Jr. 16
have done the legal community, and the community at large, a great service
by resurrecting this important lesson from history and reminding us how
jealously we should guard the Bill of Rights in the criminal process. The
authors use interviews, court transcripts, newspaper accounts and private
papers to reconstruct the events surrounding the sexual assault of young
Nevada and the sham trial of Johnson.
Contempt of Court begins in the United States Supreme Court and
moves to a retrospective account of the crime and the events leading up to
the Supreme Court contempt proceedings. The first six chapters detail the
crime, the trial, historical background on the Chattanooga community, and
the fervent determination of the crowd to lynch Johnson. The next six chap-
ters explore the promising but futile attempts through the habeas corpus
petition to spare Johnson from execution or lynching. The last four chapters
focus on the Supreme Court contempt proceedings, which lead to a guilty
verdict against Chattanooga's Sheriff Shipp, his deputies and numerous
members of the mob that lynched Johnson.
11 See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
408 (Kennit L. Hall, ed., 1992).
12 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In Powell, often referred to as "the Scottsboro Boys" case,
nine black teenagers were convicted of raping tw6 white women and sentenced to
death after a trial without effective assistance of counsel. The Court reversed the
convictions and held that due process required that states provide defendants
charged with a capital offense with adequate representation. Id. at 71.
13 297 U.S. 278 (1936). The Court reversed the conviction of a black defendant
who was severely tortured to obtain a confession. The Court, again relying on the
due process clause, held that confessions procured from helpless defendants were
involuntary and inadmissible.
14 See 14 Stat. 385 (1867).
15 Mark Curriden is the legal affairs writer for the Dallas Morning News.
16 Leroy Phillips, Jr. is a prominent trial attorney in Chattanooga, Tennessee.
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While the account of the legal aspects of the story are rudimentary
and often tedious, the authors have written an engaging story with detailed
historical and antidotal accounts of the crime, the trials and, most important,
the mood of the country at the time when states defiantly resisted federal
intervention and people openly encouraged horrific lynchings such as that
of Johnson. 17 This review recounts the crime, Johnson's trial, the signifi-
cant constitutional and ethical issues raised, and the various legal proceed-
ings leading to the contempt of court proceedings in the Supreme Court.
1.
The trial account and the cast of characters read like a John
Grishom novel. The story begins in Chattanooga, Tennessee in 1906. The
authors aptly describe the Ed Johnson case as "a fascinating and heartbreak-
ing tale of an innocent man, a politically motivated Southern sheriff, two
heroic African American lawyers, and a state-court system that refused to
provide justice for all." 18 In the end, one black man is brutally murdered,
the careers of his two black attorneys destroyed,, the entire black community
terrorized, but the law enforcement officers that conspired with the lynch
mob are canonized. The Supreme Court redeems its honor and asserts its
authority to prevent state action that violates constitutionally guaranteed
rights and freedoms.
A. Cast Of Characters
The journalistic detail paid to the cast of characters in the story
immediately captures the attention and imagination of the reader. The most
engaging personality is Noah Walter Parden, the Black Chattanooga attor-
ney and architect of Ed Johnson's appeal and habeas corpus petition to the
Supreme Court.19 Many of his writings provide primary source material for
the book.20
Convinced of Johnson's innocence, Parden, a follower of Booker T.
Washington, and his partner Styles Linton Hutchins, a proponent of Wil-
liam E.B. DuBois, seek to have his guilty verdict overturned. Lewis Shep-
pard, one of the three court-appointed white trial attorneys, joined Parden
17 Ed Johnson was one of 62 black Americans lynched in 1906. Between 1882
and 1944, 4,708 lynchings of African Americans took place. See CONTEMPT OF
COURT, supra note 1, at 215-216, 353.
18 CONTEMPT OF COURT, supra note 1, at xiv.
19 See id. at 3.
20 See id. at xvi.
2002 IMPORTANT LESSONS FROM HISTORY 151
and Hutchins.21 Sheppard, a seasoned criminal defense attorney and former
judge, was the most prominent member of the local Chattanooga bar.22 Af-
ter the appeals in state court failed, Emmanuel Molyneaux Hewlett, a prom-
inent black attorney in Washington, sponsored Parden's admission to the
Supreme Court. Parden argued before Justice John Marshall Harlan, author
of the dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,23 for a stay of Johnson's execution
pending a full review of the case.24
Hamilton County Sheriff Joseph Shipp, his Chief Deputy Fred
Frawley, Criminal Court Judge Samuel D. McReynolds, and District Attor-
ney General Matt Whitaker conspired from beginning to end to assure a
politically satisfactory outcome in the Ed Johnson case. They certainly had
no idea that their local plot to secure their political positions would garner
the national spotlight and jail time.
When the United States Justice Department filed criminal contempt
charges against Shipp, citizens created a legal defense fund for him and the
other defendants. Dozens of lawyers offered to represent him without
charge. His political popularity increased with the announcement of the
contempt charges. Shipp's response to the contempt charges was to blame
the Supreme Court for precipitating Johnson's lynching by interfering with
the actions of state authorities. 25 Despite his conviction, Sheriff Shipp be-
came a hero.
B. The Crime, The Trial and Chattanooga
The authors describe Chattanooga as "progressive" until the adop-
tion of the Black Codes in Tennessee in the 1890s.26 Black owned busi-
21 See id. at 141.
22 See id. at 60-62.
23 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
24 See CONTEMPT OF COURT, supra note 1, at 13-14.
25 See id. at 257-258.
26 "Black Codes" were adopted throughout the South as early as 1865 to under-
mine the Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment. See
Aremona G. Bennett, Freedom: Personal Liberty and Private Law: Phantom Free-
dom: Official Acceptance of Violence to Personal Security and Subversion of Pro-
prietary Rights and Ambition Following Emancipation, 1065-1910, 70 Cm.-KENT
L. REv. 439, 453-454 (1994) (demonstrating the use of Black Codes to maintain the
indicia of slavery to secure the economic and social subjugation of new black citi-
zens); see also Gary Stewart, Black Codes and Broken Windows: The Legacy of
Racial Hegemony in Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 YALE L.J. 2249, 2258-2259
(1998) (using vagrancy provisions in Black Codes to retain control of black labor
population).
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nesses thrived and the city boasted an unusually high number of black
professionals. 27 But when young Nevada Taylor was raped and robbed in
1903 on her way home from work, the city was in the mist of a "Negro
crime problem" blamed on "Negro thugs. '2
Taylor was unable to provide a description of her attacker and there
was no corroborating evidence. She could only identify her attacker's
voice.29 But Sheriff Shipp was under pressure to end the crime wave in
order to win reelection.30 Someone black had to pay.
The arrest of Ed Johnson came after inflammatory newspaper re-
ports called for the "Negro fiend" perpetrator to be lynched. 31 The first
attempt to lynch Johnson came shortly after his arrest. The jail was de-
stroyed, but no arrests were made. Johnson was taken to Nashville to avert
the lynching. 32
During the three-day trial, the newspapers focused a great deal of
attention on Johnson's physical features to further inflame the community.
Articles characterized Johnson as "a Negro with a peculiar method of walk-
ing" and a "strange" and "noticeable" voice. The news article continued,
"His noise is sharp and his skin is very dark. His eyes are bloodshot. His
nose seems to spring suddenly to its position making an extraordinarily
sharp angle with his forehead. The lower part of his nose and mouth, in-
cluding the front portion of his checks, protrude from his face in a curious
fashion. '33 The prosecutor characterized Black witnesses for Johnson as
"black men who were alcoholic gamblers" and a "Negro of a fun-making
variety. ' 34 On the other hand, defense and prosecution described a Black
witness for Johnson as "an old time Negro... given much respect" in both
communities. But despite being a respected "old time Negro" four white
witnesses were called to vouch for his character for truthfulness.35
27 See CONTEMPT OF COURT, supra note 1, at 24.
28 Id. at 30.
29 See id. at 93.
30 See id. at 35.
31 Id. at 26.
32 See id. at 41-50.
33 Id. at 93.
34 Id. at 100, 102.
35 Id. at 102-104. The credibility of black witnesses is still an issue today. See
Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Color of Truth: Race and the Assessment of Credibility, 1
MICH. J. RACE & L. 261 (1996) (looking at current and historical race-based assess-
ments of credibility); see also Withers v. United States, 602 F. 2d 124 (6th Cir.
1979) (reversing conviction based on prosecution closing statement "not one white
witness has been produced in this case" to contradict the testimony of the govem-
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The use of stereotypical racial features and character traits to justify
the subordination of people of color was a common practice during this
era.36 These stereotypes were often justified by allegedly "scientific" theo-
ries that established the notion of hierarchy among racial categories. 37
While much of this science has been rejected, some scholars persist in per-
petuating such theories. 38 In Jinro America, Inc. v. Secure Investments,
Inc. 39 the court excluded so-called expert testimony that Korean businesses
use corrupt practices as unduly prejudicial as tinged with "ethnic bias and
stereotyping." 40 In the legal profession, the intractable problem of racial
bias and stereotyping continues to hinder the fair administration of justice.41
Seventeen days after the attack on Nevada Taylor, Johnson was
convicted and sentenced to death by an all white male jury.4 2 Fifty-three
days after his arrest, a mob of citizens, in complicity with Sheriff Shipp and
accompanied by local news reporters, dragged Ed Johnson from his cell and
brutally lynched, then shot him. 43
II.
Johnson was arrested and tried absent the procedural protections we
have become accustomed to as a result of the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment during the Civil Rights era. Readers
familiar with the criminal process will cringe at what today would be fla-
grant violations of rights, the strategic errors by the defense, and the unethi-
ment's white witness) and Commonwealth v. Sowers, 388 Mass. 207 (1983) (ques-
tioning jurors on their ability to fairly weight the credibility of white witnesses
against the credibility of black witnesses).
36 The relevance of racial appearance in turn of the century cases has been well
documented. See IAN F. HANEY-LOPEZ, WHITE By LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUC-
TION OF RACE (1996) (detailing the use of physical appearance by courts and agen-
cies to determine "whiteness" for the purpose of naturalization).
37 Id. at 4-9, 92-102.
38 See e.g., CHARLES MURRAY & RICHARD HERRNSTEIN, THE BELL CURVE (1994).
39 266 F.3d 993 (2001).
40 Id. at 1006.
41 See e.g. GEORGIA SUPREME COURT COMMISSION ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS
IN THE COURT SYSTEM, LET JUSTICE BE DONE: EQUALITY, FAIRNESS AND IMPARTI-
ALrrY (August 1995); see also CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY COMMIS-
SION ON RACE AND ETHNIC BIAS IN THE COURTS, FAIRNESS IN THE CALIFORNIA
STATE COURTS: A SURVEY OF THE PUBLIC, ATTORNEYS AND COURT PERSONNEL
(July 1993).
42 See CONTEMPT OF COURT, supra note 1, at 129.
43 See id. at 214.
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cal consorting of Judge McReynolds with the District Attorney. Before and
during the trial, the state violated numerous rights now recognized as ex-
tending to state suspects and defendants under the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.
Before the trial, the Sheriff ordered the search of the home of John-
son's sister without a warrant or sufficient probable cause. The search failed
to produce any evidence linking Johnson to the crime.44 Despite the lack of
evidence, however, the Sheriff arrested Johnson and questioned him with-
out an attorney present or without advising him of his right against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. 45 The Sheriff continued to tram-
mel Johnson's right against self-incrimination and his right to counsel by
using another inmate as an informant in hopes of getting Johnson to confess
without the benefit of counsel.46
In 1906, the Tennessee Constitution was one of the few that guaran-
teed the right to counsel to any person facing the death penalty. 47 However,
with very little procedural safeguards to insure the impartiality of the jury48
Johnson was tried by an all white jury. During the trial, the jury, troubled by
Nevada Taylor's inability to give a positive identification of her assailant,
requested that she be recalled and that Johnson don the type of hat her
perpetrator was alleged to have been wearing and stand in front of her.
Despite the objections of his attorneys, Judge McReynolds allowed the
44 See id. at 37-38.
45 See id. at 39. See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S 436 (1966), which was
decided 60 years later and held that criminal suspects were entitled to have counsel
present during custodial interrogations to protect their right against self-incrimina-
tion; Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.428 (2000) (affirming the holding in
Miranda as an immutable constitutional rule).
46 In Massiah v. Unites States, 377 U.S. 201(1964), the Court held that the Consti-
tution is violated when the government solicits an informant to intentionally elicit
incriminating information from a person against whom judicial proceedings have
commenced without having counsel present.
47 The right to counsel in a capital case was first guaranteed under the due process
clause of the federal constitution in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a felony case was established in Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S.25 (1963).
48 In numerous rulings, the Court has made clear that parties cannot systematically
exclude women or other distinct groups in the population from the jury or the jury
pool. See e.g. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986); see also Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); J.E.B. v. Ala-
bama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
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demonstration, ignoring the clear violation of Johnson's Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination. 9
In closing, defense counsel accused the judge of bias and
concluded,
This case wasn't about justice. This case wasn't about find-
ing the truth. This case wasn't about preserving the rule of
law. Justice and truth and the rule of law have been tram-
pled on in this very case. 0
Despite this impassioned plea, the jury convicted Johnson. The defense
counsel made the strategic errors of waiving their client's right to request a
new trial, thus foreclosing an appeal. 5' The threat of another lynch mob
deterred Johnson's white lawyers from requesting a new trial to preserve
the right of appeal, even with their concern of jury tampering.5 2
This catalogue of violations would have invalidated the arrest, pros-
ecution and conviction of Ed Johnson today. Compounding the problem
was the unethical conduct of the judge and prosecutor. For instance, shortly
before Johnson's trial, the prosecutor intentionally played "the race card" in
another case against black defendants with members of the local press pre-
sent to insure that potential jurors in the Johnson case would have race on
their minds. 53 But even in light of the racially charged atmosphere created
by the Sheriff and the District Attorney who would prosecute Johnson, the
court denied the defense motions to delay the trial and to change venue.5 4
The most troubling ethical breaches were the continuous ex parte
meetings between the Judge, the District Attorney and the Sheriff. During
the first meeting, Sheriff Shipp advised the Judge and prosecutor, before
Johnson's arrest, that Johnson was guilty.55 They next met after Johnson's
arrest to plan the trial and trial strategy. 56 Again the Judge conspired with
the District Attorney on how to prevent an appeal and assure Johnson's
execution after Noah Parden submitted a post-trial motion for a new trial. 57
The Judge also meets once ex parte with defense counsel to suggest that
49 See CONTEMPT OF COURT, supra note 1, at 108.
50 Id. at 112.
51 See id. at 127.
52 See id.
53 Id. at 78-79.
54 See id. at 82.
55 See id. at 40.
56 See id. at 59.
57 See id. at 142-143.
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they not spend much time on a pro bono case.58 Although there was no
extensive Code of Professional Responsibility in 1906, the intent of these
meetings was clearly to insure a political victory at the expense of justice.
This was unethical even without a Code.59
III.
After Judge McReynolds rejected Parden's motion for a new trial,
the authors focus on the appeal, the habeas corpus proceedings and the con-
tempt proceedings precipitated by the lynching of Ed Johnson while in fed-
eral custody under a Supreme Court ordered stay of execution.
A. Appeal and Habeas Corpus
Much like today, in 1906 habeas corpus was viewed as a disfavored
tactic to delay punishment.60 White and black citizens of Chattanooga criti-
cized Noah Parden and his partner Styles Hutchins for attempting to over-
turn the verdict. 61 Parden's office was set on fire, 62 but he and his partner
persevered despite the strong opposition. 63 Eventually, Lewis Sheppard
agreed to help. 64
Parden based his post-trial strategy on the growing disenchantment
of the bench and bar with the lack of professionalism in state courts, which
resulted in lack of adequate legal protection and due process for black and
poor white criminal defendants.65 Although federal courts had aggressively
expanded the federal government's role in the regulation of commerce, the
Supreme Court displayed no similar willingness to expand individual rights
and liberties under the federal constitution. 66
Parden sought a writ of error in the Tennessee Supreme Court. He
argued that the evidence in the case did not warrant a conviction; the evi-
58 See id. at 62-63.
59 The Canons of Judicial Ethics prohibit a judge from initiating, permitting or
considering ex parte communications with limited exceptions. Canon 3B(7). None
of the current exceptions would have excused the conduct of Judge McReynolds.
60 See id. at 151.
61 See id. at 146.
62 See id. at 178.
63 For a detailed discussion of the struggle of black lawyers at the turn of the
century, see J. CLAY SMrrH, EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER
1844-1944 (1993).
64 See CONTEMPr OF COURT, supra note 1, at 147.
65 See id. at 175-176.
66 See id. at 182.
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dence during the trial actually demonstrated the defendant's innocence; a
lynch-mob mentality permeated the entire trial and placed undue pressure
on the jury to convict the defendant; the attempt to lynch Johnson before the
trial violated the state constitutional guarantee to a fair trial and due pro-
cess; and the jury demonstrated bias against the defendant when they threat-
ening to kill him during the trial in open court.67 The court granted the
motion for a writ of error, but refused to stay the execution. 68
Parden had already anticipated defeat and immediately filed a peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court. Parden argued
before Judge Charles Dickens Clark that Johnson had been denied due pro-
cess and equal protection. 69 Parden filed the "writ of habeas corpus" a
week before the execution date under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.70
The 1867 Act expanded the reach of the federal courts, granted fed-
eral courts the power to intervene in state judicial proceedings and issue a
writ of habeas corpus for a person held in violation of federal law. This
represented a significant change from the 1789 Act, which had been inter-
preted by the Chief Justice John Marshall's Court to limit federal habeas
corpus exclusively to federal prisoners.71 Following the Civil War, concern
over the illegal detention of former slaves prompted the introduction of leg-
islation that eventually formed the basis of the expanded 1867 Act.72 Al-
though the Supreme Court never reviewed Johnson's habeas petition, Noah
Parden was on target in seeking a reversal of his conviction under the 1867
Act. Subsequent cases filed in similar scenarios of racially charged trials
resulted in the ultimate expansion of habeas relief.73
67 See id. at 147-148.
68 See id. at 149.
69 See id. at 150.
70 The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 385 (1867).
71 See Eric M. Freedman, Just Because John Marshall Said It, Doesn't Make It
So: Ex Parte Bollman and the Illusory Prohibition on the Federal Writ of Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners in the Judiciary Act of 1789, 51 ALA. L. REv. 531, 536
(2000).
72 See Michael O'Neill, On Reforming the Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus, 26
SETON HALL L. REv. 1493, 1507-1510 (1996).
73 See Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) (anti-Semitic mobs adversely im-
pacted the outcome of the trial in Georgia); see also Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S.
86 (1923) (exclusion of blacks from the jury and ineffective assistance of counsel
in trial of blacks accused of killing a white assailant in Arkansas); Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443 (1953) (coerced confession and race discrimination in jury selections
grounds for granting habeas review by district court).
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Although the catalogue of violations discussed in Part II would
qualify as due process violations today, the Court in 1906 narrowly con-
strued the meaning of "due process" and limited violations to cases where
the charges were not based on existing law, the state procedural rules were
violated, or the defendant was denied the opportunity to be heard during the
trial.74 Law-enforcement tactics such as beating a confession from a witness
or defendant,75 or suppressing evidence pointing to the innocence of the
defendant76 were not considered violations of a state criminal defendant's
rights in 1906. So weak and ineffective was the due-process clause that
Parden could not find a single case over the previous forty years in which
the US Supreme Court or the federal courts had reversed a state-court con-
viction on the basis of it.77
Since most of the allegations in the writ of error focused on jury
bias, the writ of habeas corpus relied on the Supreme Court decision of
Strauder v. West Virginia.78 Strauder held that the equal protection clause is
violated when states and counties intentionally and systematically exclude
blacks from the jury. This was the only case since the Civil War in which
the Supreme Court had reversed a state court criminal conviction on equal
protection grounds. 79 Parden also proffered an equal protection violation
claim based on the fact that black men in Chattanooga accused of raping
white women were always convicted, whereas men accused of raping black
women rarely if at all punished.80
Judge Clark ruled that the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial did
not apply to state court trials, but issued a stay of execution to give the
defendant an opportunity to seek an appeal of his ruling to the United States
Supreme Court.81
74 See CONTEMPT OF COURT, supra note 1, at 151.
75 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
76 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (imposing constitutional duty under
the due process clause on the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence to the
defense).
77 See id.
78 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
79 See CONTEMPT OF COURT, supra note 1, at 14, 151. Compare Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (giving defense counsel the right to object to the use of
preemptory challenges by the prosecutor to exclude blacks from the jury).
80 See CONTEMPT OF COURT, supra note 1, at 166.
81 See id. at 168.
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B. The Path to the Supreme Court Contempt Proceedings
It is hard to grasp the degree of and depth to which the average
citizen and state law enforcement person despised the idea of federal inter-
ference into state affairs in 1906. The Chattanooga Times captured this sen-
timent writing, "It was the appeal to the federal courts that revived the mob
spirit and resulted in the lynching. . .The Supreme Court of the United
States ought in its wisdom to take cognizance of this fact. ' 82 Judge Mc-
Reynolds was personally offended by the federal court intervention in cases
within the state court's jurisdiction. 3 The historical record notes that,
"Both Shipp and McReynolds were unsure as to whether an order issued by
a federal judge superseded an order from a state court judge in a state-court
criminal case. '84 Even Judge Clark conceded that his authority was in ques-
tion and deferred to the governor to grant a reprieve in lieu of the judge's
stay.8 5
The subtitle, "The Turn-of-the-Century Trial That Launched 100
Years of Federalism," attests to the significance of United States v. Shipp in
American politics and jurisprudence. Johnson's lynching in defiance of the
Supreme Court ordered stay launched the federalism era that ultimately
culminated in the incorporation of most of the Bill of Rights into the four-
teenth amendment. 86 The Supreme Court granted Johnson's appeal of the
habeas corpus petition. This was the first time the Justices had agreed to
hear a state criminal case on federal constitutional issues involving the right
to a fair and impartial trial.87 The Court issued a stay of execution, notified
Judge Clark, Judge McReyolds and Sheriff Shipp and docketed the appeal
for expedited review. 88
The defiance of its order to stay Johnson's execution certainly was
enough to trigger the wrath of the Court.89 The Court concludes and history
confirms that Judge McReynolds (although not a named defendant) and
Sheriff Shipp set up the lynching in complicity with various private citizens
82 Id. at 219.
83 See id. at 170.
84 Id. at 171.
85 See id. at 172.
86 Justice Harlan and the federal prosecutor in Shipp, Terry Stanford, who later
became a federal judge and a Supreme Court Justice, advocated the doctrine of
incorporation. See CONTEMPT OF COURT, supra note 1, at 341-343.
87 See id. at 175, 192.
88 See id. at 193-194.
89 See id. at 230.
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and in defiance of the Supreme Court's order. In the majority opinion au-
thored by Chief Justice Melvin Fuller, the Court found,
The assertions that mob violence was not expected, and that
there was no occasion for providing more than the usual
guard of one man for the jail in Chattanooga, are quite un-
reasonable and inconsistent with statements made by Sher-
iff Shipp and his deputies that they were looking for a mob
the next day. . Only one conclusion can be drawn from
these facts, all of which are clearly established by the evi-
dence,-Shipp not only made the work of the mob easy,
but in effect aided and abetted. 90
The Court's conclusion rested on the fact that the Sheriff made sure that no
extra guards or deputies would be on duty to protect Johnson, who was
alone on the third floor. The mob had been given the prison floor plan and
there was no phone available to the lone elderly guard at the jail.91
In response to the allegation that in the south Black citizens were
systematically kept off of juries, the editor of the Chattanooga News wrote:
That allegation is a fact. The South long ago decided this to
be a white man's government... If that is treason, our crit-
ics are invited to make the most of it.
It has been an unwritten law in the South, since the memory
of man runneth not to the contrary that the black man who
assaults the white woman shall die. The law maintains in
every southern state, and is higher than any statutory law.
And once it is made certain that the guilty man has been
captured there is not enough power in the Unites States
Army to save him.. .the worthless, shiftless, criminal black
brute who outrages a white woman has no more rights
under the law than a serpent.92
After reading this, it was obvious to several members of the Court "that the
lynching had arisen out of contempt for the Court and its ruling. 93
Attorney General William Moody sent Secret Service agents under-
cover in Chattanooga to investigate and determine what if any federal
charges could be brought against the sheriff, and others who conspired to
90 United States v. Shipp, 214 U. S. 386, 416-417, 423 (1909).
91 See CONTEMPT OF COURT, supra note 1, at 200.
92 Id. at 230.
93 Id.
2002 IMPORTANT LESSONS FROM HISTORY 161
kill Johnson.94 The Justice Department considered bringing charges against
the mob (that remained unidentified even though news reporters knew who
they were) and local authorities under the criminal provisions of the 1871
Civil Rights Act. Ultimately, the Attorney General and Justices of the Court
agreed that the Justice Dept. would bring "criminal contempt of the Su-
preme Court" charges against the people involved in the lynching.95
Sheriff Shipp, his deputies and several private citizens were
charged. The Information filed with the Court alleged that they
Did willfully, unlawfully and wrongfully combine, con-
spire, confederate, and agree to break and enter the county
jail... for the purpose of taking therefrom the person of Ed
Johnson to lynch and murder him, with the intent to show
their contempt and disregard for the orders of this Honora-
ble Court.. .and for the purpose of preventing this Honora-
ble Court from hearing the appeal of Ed Johnson.. .and for
the purpose of preventing Ed Johnson from exercising and
enjoying a right secured to him by the Constitution and
laws of the United States.96
Defendants responded to the charges alleging that the Court lacked jurisdic-
tion over the claim.97 Writing for a unanimous Court Justice Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes concluded, "A state officer having prisoners committed to his
custody by a court of the United States is an officer of the United States. 98
The last two chapters recount the contempt trial held in Chatta-
nooga before a court-appointed Commissioner in the United States Customs
House. 99 Closing oral arguments were made in Washington before the Su-
preme Court. After five days of deliberation, the Court announced its
opinion. 100
In our opinion it does not admit of question on this record
that this lamentable riot was the direct result of opposition
to the administration of the law by this court. It was not
only in defiance of our mandate, but was understood to be
such. The Supreme Court of the United States was called
94 See id. at 237.
95 Id. at 252.
96 Id. at 254.
97 See id. at 262.
98 Id. at 283.
99 See id. at 287, 289, 292.
100 See id. at 327, 330-334.
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upon to abdicate its functions and decline to enter such or-
ders as the occasion, in its judgment, demanded, because of
the danger of defeat by an outbreak of lawless violence. It
is plain that what created this mob and led to this lynching
was the unwillingness of its members to submit to the delay
required for the appeal. The intent to prevent that delay by
defeating the hearing of the appeal necessarily follows from
the defendants' acts, and, if the life of anyone in custody of
the law is at the mercy of the mob, the administration of
justice becomes a mockery. When this court granted a stay
of execution on Johnson's application it became its duty to
protect him until this case shall be disposed of. And when
its mandate, issued for his protection, was defied, punish-
ment of those guilty of such attempt must be awarded. 10'
The Court found Shipp and five others guilty. After five months of debate,
the guilty were sentenced to 90 days in federal jail.102
CONCLUSION
The white men of the South claim that the Negro is the only
criminal. Yet in this case, the Negro fought on the higher
plain, while the white man depended on his brutal-
ity... Never before in the history of this country has lynch-
ing been brought so plainly within the power of the federal
government to punish the perpetrators. It is now up to the
federal government to deal out justice.103
These were Noah Parden's parting words as he left Chattanooga and the
practice of law. No one was ever tried for the murder or the violation of Ed
Johnson's civil rights. Nevada Taylor's rapist was never brought to justice.
She died in 1907 at the age of 23.104 The legal victory in the Supreme Court
could not undo the human tragedy that precipitated such protracted legal
proceedings. Contempt of Court stands as a reminder of how vigilant we
must be in protecting our rights and freedoms against encroachment by pri-
vate and public acts motivated by racial animus.
101 U.S. v. Shipp, 214 U. S. at 425.
102 See CONTEMPT OF COURT, supra note 1, at 335.
103 Id. at 234-235.
104 See id. at 340.
